which we argue inhibit the provision and use of poverty reducing M&E. 5 We argue that the achievement of this approach will allow the practice of M&E to better support improved outcomes for poor farmers while supporting donor reporting requirements. As with any proposal for change the underlying assumptions must be tested against the evidence, which this article aims to do.
The changing context for M&E
Delivering good change through public policy is challenging in any context. Headline political arguments have to be won to set a certain direction and smaller political battles have to be won for effective implementation. Demonstrating impact at scale in the real world is difficult. When there is a political and spatial dislocation between funders and intended beneficiaries the ability of the latter to hold the former to account is weakened. Poor programme performance is not sufficiently challenged, good programme performance not sufficiently incentivised. There is a broken feedback loop (Barder 2009) . Situate this broken feedback loop within systems that have weaker capacities to monitor resources and are subject to frequent disruptions and it is inevitable that there is a weak learning and impact culture in aid and international development more broadly.
These concerns were crystallised in the Paris Declaration with a renewed call to improve the quality of aid in terms of ownership (countries set their own priorities), harmonisation (donors avoid overburdening countries), mutual accountability, results, and alignment (donors get behind country priorities).
In the past five years the quality agenda has got bogged down (Wood et al. 2008) , while most of the additional attention has been on maintaining and increasing aid flows. The global financial crisis has put quantity at risk and has led to a refocusing on quality. There is now a stronger emphasis on results, transparency, accountability to taxpayers and the citizens of aid-receiving countries, and value for money for all.
The field of agriculture has not yet, we argue, responded to this call to arms in any significant way. But now it has to, because after decades of neglect there is a renewed focus on agricultural development with an upturn in resources going to agriculture. 6 There is a greater interest in initiatives that aim to make a difference to poor farmers' lives. However, with new interest and resources comes an increased need to ensure that initiatives lead to positive sustained change on the ground. Are we seeing improvements in agricultural productivity which are equitable and sustainable? Is there greater social inclusion for poor farmers? Are resources directed towards initiatives that correspond to the priorities of poor farmers? Are we seeing agriculture fulfil its potential to deliver food security, nutrition and poverty alleviation? Within the current climate of austerity the need for agriculture and agricultural M&E to respond is even greater.
Many within the agricultural development community recognise the need to strengthen their accountability to poor farmers and other stakeholders. For instance:
The recent Global Conference on Agricultural Research for Development (GCARD) had results for poor communities and wider partnerships as key cross-cutting themes and the lead paper for the conference noted: '…a change is needed in the incentive structures in the national and international research community to deliver impacts for the poor… [S]ystems need to be more accountable to their beneficiaries ' (Lele et al. 2010: xii) However, to date, reality is falling short of this rhetoric. Our own analysis of agricultural M&E based on a survey of M&E practitioners and agricultural experts 7 (see Figure 1) indicates that 50 per cent of the respondents think that current M&E practice does not provide good accountability to beneficiaries. According to the 209 respondents, the strongest feature of current M&E practice is the ability to lead to practical improvements in projects, closely followed by the ability to provide good accountability to donors and clarify internal strategies and policy objectives. Current practice is also good at generating wider lessons for the field, but it rarely provides good accountability to beneficiaries, rarely empowering them or building their capacity. Accounting to donors and therefore taxpayers seems to be a greater priority than exhibiting accountability to beneficiaries. These results characterise a culture of compliance rather than one of sustainable results.
3 What is the state of M&E in agriculture?
The broad consensus in the literature is that M&E -including agriculture -is weaker than it should be. The shortcomings of M&E make familiar reading. In a wide ranging review of the state of M&E Munce (2005) Other major criticisms include:
Not enough resources spent on impact evaluations -i.e. studies that document the extent to which changes in the wellbeing of the target population can be attributed to the particular programme (measuring net changes) (CGD 2006 and Ravallion 2008) . Not enough focus on the trajectories for impact -i.e. the pathways of impact, particularly in relation to the time it takes to achieve impact (Woolcock 2009 Finally, from the stakeholder survey reported on in Figure 1 , Figure 2 reports that a majority of respondents (56 per cent) stated that in their opinions M&E in agriculture was weak or very weak.
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Taken together, this evidence suggests that M&E is weak and that M&E in agriculture is no exception.
4 Why is M&E in agriculture so weak?
Generally, we argue that the major drivers of weak M&E in agriculture are common to many sectors and are: a a failure of the stakeholders to appreciate the multiple benefits of M&E; b a failure of the investors to capture the multiple benefits of M&E as a result of: the public goods aspects of M&E a misalignment of implementer incentives to collect and use M&E data; c the sensitive nature of M&E data which creates information asymmetries between M&E providers and users and results in underprovision of M&E.
We make the case that (a) these drivers can be addressed through a focus on the multiple purposes of M&E so that the multiple benefits are identified and captured and information asymmetries are diminished, and (b) the different stakeholders involved in M&E investment, provision and use will likely have different knowledge of and preferences about these five purposes and so a focus on multiple purposes is best achieved by seeking the perspectives of several stakeholders. Figure 3 identifies five different purposes of M&E 11 (as distinct from types of M&E) with opportunities for learning for all the stakeholders involved in M&E.
Driver 1 A failure to appreciate the multiple benefits of M&E
M&E can generate benefits in each of these five areas. If the benefits are understood and realised, then they will spur additional commitment, not just in terms of additional investments in time and resources, but in terms of general prioritisation of M&E. Since there are often limited resources available for M&E, the preferences of the more powerful actors will tend to dominate the way in which M&E is provided (see Oswald and Taylor, this IDS Bulletin). As we have seen in Figure 1 majorities of the surveyed stakeholders think that M&E currently generates project improvements, provides good accountability to donors and leads to clarification of internal strategies and policy objectives. These three functions are clearly of interest to those who invest in M&E. If more stakeholders were involved in project design and evaluation, would a more rounded picture of benefits develop? We argue that this would be the case, thereby attracting additional commitment towards M&E.
Driver 2 A failure to capture the multiple benefits of M&E
We argue that there are two types of 'failure to capture':
Investors may have an appreciation of the full range of benefits generated by M&E, but are simply unable to capture them because they are open to others for use and investors do not stand directly to benefit. This is a particular risk for private investment in M&E. There is a failure to capture benefits due to a lack of organisational incentives (e.g. incentives that disconnect those who initiated a programme from the results when they emerge).
On the first type of 'failure to capture ' Ravallion (2008) argues that underinvestment in M&E (or what he calls evaluative research) happens when project practitioners and funders do not stand to capture all the benefits of their investments. Drawing on numerous examples he argues that this public goods aspect of M&E will result in a particularly large underinvestment in M&E in (a) projects that will not yield short-term results, 12 (b) projects that have more diffuse impacts, and (c) projects that help us understand the relevance of results for other contexts (external validation). The 'underinvestment due to the public goods nature of M&E' reasoning is used in the Center for Global Development's report When Will We Ever Learn? (CGD 2006) . This article, one of the outputs leading to the formation of 3ie, identifies an 'evaluation gap' which, it asserts, is costly.
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The report classifies M&E into four categories: (a) monitoring (are projects being implemented according to plan), (b) process and institution evaluations (how and why are things going to plan, or not), (c) performance assessments (that demonstrate accountability to stakeholders 'by providing information about their activities and opening their books'), and (d) impact assessments. It argues that the evaluation gap is especially serious in the latter category, impact assessments. They make the case that this is because of two factors: firstly, the public goods aspect (e.g. on methods and results) leads to underinvestment and, secondly, the additional data that need to be collected (e.g. comparator data) are very resource intensive.
Whereas the Centre for Governance and Development (CDG) identify only the global public goods aspects of impacts assessments, there are significant public goods aspects in other forms of M&E. On monitoring, there are methods that need to be shared to identify the purpose of the monitoring. For example, Ravallion (2000) maps spending (i.e. monitoring data) by poverty rates to get some real time data on the targeting performance of programmes. There are also methods that need to be shared to allow different stakeholders to monitor different groups, for example methods for allowing farmers to monitor agricultural development projects. On process evaluations, there is value in sharing methods for Figure 3 The five purposes of M&E assessing capacities ex ante (can the organisation, its implementing staff and the institutional context within which they reside sustain the project?) and ex post (did the project leave the organisation stronger or weaker?). The significant public goods aspects and additional data needs in the other three M&E categories suggest these areas are also significantly underinvested in.
The second type of 'failure to capture' relates to organisational incentives. Oswald and Taylor in this IDS Bulletin identify four types of misaligned incentives:
15
The incentive to demonstrate impact, the disincentive to learn why: The current trend to demonstrate impact means that there is often an incentive for organisations to focus on what is easy to measure within an M&E process and less attention is given to learning how and why an intervention has been successful or not. This argument can be linked to the debate on M&E methods (see Lucas and Longhurst, this IDS Bulletin) . The incentive for upward accountability, the disincentive to learn from below: Many development organisations are unbalanced to deliver on upward accountability. This can create incentives to value the knowledge and learning that donors demand, rather than the knowledge and learning that other stakeholders (including the organisation itself) value or require.
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The incentive to 'do', the disincentive to 'learn': In many development organisations a particular member of staff or department is responsible for M&E, and others are responsible for implementation, with limited interaction and mutual learning. The incentive is for some staff to 'do' and different staff to 'learn'. The incentive to conform, the disincentive to take risks: Learning involves changes in behaviour and actions and inherently involves shifting power relationships. This can create disincentives for organisations to learn, as the learning outcomes can be challenging to those in positions of authority.
Driver 3 The closed and sensitive nature of the M&E system
This is the hypothesised driver for which we have least evidence. Nevertheless it is clear that M&E is a sensitive business. It is embarrassing to finance a programme that has little impact. It is hardly career advancing if your monitoring system shows milestones being missed. This means M&E reports have less chance of being made public. This also diminishes the incentives of managers to respond to M&E data. This leads to a more closed system with two types of information asymmetry between users and suppliers of M&E:
Organisational reputation: Do M&E users have a good track record of using M&E? Do M&E suppliers provide value for money? Quality of the services currently being provided and used:
Are M&E services responsive to the needs of users? Are M&E services being used?
Unlike for most research, donors and other users of M&E have no third party peer review process to validate the quality of most M&E. The providers do not know enough about donors' past and potential use of M&E services. This is compounded by the different preferences and needs these groups have for M&E. Information asymmetries will diminish effective M&E supply in the medium run as users are discouraged by reception of M&E they did not anticipate and in turn providers are discouraged by the non-use of their work.
Because of these three hypothesised driversfailure to appreciate benefits, failure to capture benefits and information gaps between M&E users and providers -we argue that M&E in general suffers from a lack of investment, provision and use and cannot enable the needed alignment of incentives of funders, implementers, service providers, and intended beneficiaries to increase the impacts on poverty.
Is there anything particularly special about agriculture?
Although M&E is weak in general, we suggest that there are certain features of agriculture that make it even more difficult to achieve good M&E:
Lack of consensus on the overall goal of agriculture: Impacts for farm households can be both direct (e.g. higher farm income) and indirect (e.g. higher wages need to be paid for indemand farm workers). Similarly for the wider rural/urban space, impacts can be both direct (e.g. lower food prices) and indirect (e.g.
improved food security and thus political stability). This makes it more difficult to agree on the purpose of M&E (see MeinzenDick et al. 2003 We hypothesise that a 'people-centred' perspective on M&E can help change the dynamic by: finding ways to balance multiple accountabilities; focusing on learning within organisations and the individual incentives for learning; finding ways to share M&E performance information more openly. The focus is on inclusion, organisation and incentives, rather than an emphasis only on tools and methods. Our arguments are summarised in Table 2 .
What does the evidence say about these three hypotheses?
Balancing multiple accountabilities
As we argue above, in order to reap the full benefits of M&E, there is a need to balance multiple accountabilities and align the preferences of all stakeholders. In practice this means greater involvement of beneficiaries in M&E activities, along with all other stakeholders. We argue that greater involvement of beneficiaries in M&E activities is a key leverage point to strengthen M&E provision, in addition to being the 'right' thing to do.
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What does the evidence have to say about the value of balancing multiple accountabilities? In the absence of directly relevant literatures, we focus on papers that ask (a) does participation in project design (upstream M&E) enhance outcomes? and (b) do social accountability mechanisms (downstream M&E) improve outcomes?
In terms of the feedback loop in Figure 4 , we are interested in the evidence of whether the arrows going from right to left improve outcomes.
Does participation improve project outcomes?
Mansuri and Rao (2004) provide a review of community-driven projects in terms of the impacts of participation on targeting, service delivery and sustainability. The review finds that targeting of the poor is improved by the participation of intended beneficiaries, but tending to this only when preferences are egalitarian, decision-making is open and transparent, and the rules for classifying households as poor are clear. The authors conclude 'some studies have shown an association between the level of some index of participation and project effectiveness, but the direction of causality is unclear.' Nevertheless a number of multi-project studies that pay attention to causality in fact find that participation improves delivery of water projects in Indonesia (Isham et al. 1994) , 21 public works in South Africa (Hoddinott et al. 2001 ) and the maintenance of rural support programmes in Northern Pakistan (Khwaja 2001) . 22 Many more studies are cited which pay less attention to causality and there the results are mixed.
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Another review paper by Platteau (2007: 38) 24 summarises the difficulty with these studies: 'measurement of the impact of participation on development project outcomes is methodologically complex, and, at this stage, there are still few conclusive statements that can be made about the importance and the modus operandi of this impact'.
The Platteau paper restricts itself to quantitative outcomes in a cause and effect framework. Taking a more qualitative systematic approach a recent paper by Gaventa and Barrett (2010) reviews a non-random sample of 100 case studies of citizen engagement in 20 countries conducted over a ten-year period by one research programme consortium. It finds that citizen participation produced positive effects across developmental and democratic outcomes in 75 per cent of the outcomes. 25 The study highlights the importance of looking at intermediate outcomes; it is difficult to draw a straight line between participation and development outcomes without looking at the process of engagement which might facilitate empowerment outcomes and contribute to development outcomes.
We conclude that there is plenty of evidence that participation can make a positive difference to development outcomes, but that it certainly does not have to. The impacts depend on a wide range of context factors, often relating to norms around hierarchy and power.
Do social accountability mechanisms improve outcomes?
Many mechanisms for making government and private sector actors more accountable to citizens have been trialled over the last decade. These include citizen report cards (CRCs), budget tracking, community scorecards, citizen juries, project monitors, community expenditure tracking and social audits of commitments and realities on the ground (Arroyo and Sirker 2005) . The studies of their impacts are not methodologically strong, at least in terms of accounting for causality. Paul (1998) was one of the first to grapple with the measurement of the impact of the citizen report card on changes in the quality and responsiveness of service providers. In the context of evaluating the response of Bangalore's public services to report card implementation, he concludes:
there is some evidence that public awareness of these problems has increased as a result of the experiment. Civil society institutions seem to be more active on this front and their interactions with public agencies have become better organised, purposive and continuous. As a result, some public agencies in Bangalore have begun to take steps to improve their services. The paper concludes that public feedback ('voice') in the form of a report card has the potential to challenge governments and their agencies to become more efficient and responsive to customers (Paul 1998: 2) . Ravindra (2004) also undertakes a review of the Bangalore public service experience with the report card for the World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department. The paper concludes: on the whole, the impact of the CRCs has been positive. They helped to increase public awareness of the quality of services and stimulated citizen groups to demand better services. They influenced key officials in understanding the perceptions of ordinary citizens and the role of civil society in city governance. Bangalore has witnessed a number of improvements following the CRCs, particularly the second one. The state government and public agencies launched a number of reforms to improve the infrastructure and services in the city, including via property tax reform through a self-assessment scheme, the creation of the Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF), and streamlining of agencies' internal systems and procedures. There is now greater transparency in the operations of government agencies and better responsiveness to citizens' needs. While a number of other factors have also contributed to the transformation of Bangalore, the CRCs acted as a catalyst in the process (Ravindra 2004: iii) .
Conducting further research on the report card experience in Bangalore and Jaipur, Deichmann and Lall (2003) question the very theory of change of citizen scorecards of service provision. Do perceptions of quality received bear any resemblance to actual quality received? They find that scores are indeed influenced by the quality of services provided, but scores are also influenced by a number of household characteristics, including the quality of services provision received by peers. Brixi (2009: 2) assesses that the impact of the use of a citizen scorecard survey helps Chinese citizens influence urban service provision design and implementation, helping policymakers to 'reveal weaknesses and monitor progress in public service delivery'.
McNamara (2006) reviews US and developing country evidence on the impacts of health provider report cards on accountability to citizens and in the quality of healthcare provision. She points out that the idea of provider-specific reports is not new:
I am fain to sum up with an urgent appeal for adopting this or some uniform system of publishing the statistical records of hospitals. If they could be obtained … they would show subscribers how their money was being spent, The paper concludes that 'there is evidence that provider-specific comparative reporting, and in particular public reporting, enhances provider accountability and prompts improvements in quality of care ' (McNamara 2006: 106) .
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One of the most rigorous studies in the classical sense is a randomised field trial of communitybased monitoring of public primary healthcare providers in Uganda. It finds evidence that the implementation of 'citizen report cards' reduced child mortality by 33 per cent, as well as generating other health benefits. A year after the intervention, treatment communities were more involved in monitoring the provider and health workers appeared to exercise greater effort in serving the community. The study documents large increases in utilisation and improved health outcomes. Within the experiment, the cost per child death averted was $300, well below the average of $887 for 23 other interventions (Björkman and Svensson 2009 ). This study seems to support our analysis that beneficiary feedback can drive up performance by ensuring that implementers become more responsive to the needs of beneficiaries.
Another rigorous evaluation shows little improvement in public sector behaviour from bottom-up feedback mechanisms. Olken (2007) undertakes a randomised field experiment on reducing corruption in over 600 Indonesian village road projects. The paper finds that: increasing government audits from 4 per cent of projects to 100 per cent reduced missing expenditures, as measured by discrepancies between official project costs and an independent engineers' estimate of costs, by eight percentage points. By contrast, increasing grassroots participation in monitoring had little average impact, reducing missing expenditures only in situations with limited free-rider problems and limited elite capture (Olken 2007: 200) .
A randomised control trial by Banerjee et al. (2008) in India, on community mechanisms to hold primary schools accountable found that giving villagers information about the state of their schools was not enough -it required encouragement and training, in small groups, to turn this information into an intervention that improved learning outcomes. They conclude that 'it seems clear that the current faith in participation as a panacea for the problems of service delivery is unwarranted ' (2008: 25) .
In Kenya, in another randomised control trial, find that hiring supplementary contract teachers may be an effective way of meeting the demand for teachers in Kenya thereby reducing absenteeism and promoting learning. They find that 'the biggest gains come when local school committees are empowered to effectively monitor these teachers and when extra classes are structured so as to target instruction to students' initial achievement level '. 26 These studies are far from conclusive: some show a positive impact of feedback mechanisms on development outcomes, some show no impact, and some are not set up to conclusively demonstrate impact, just plausibility. The studies that examine the 'how' questions confirm that implementation methods, norms of fairness and expectations matter.
Enhancing organisational learning
The beginning of Section 4 argued that enhancing organisational learning can help strengthen M&E. Learning organisations would, by definition, have a greater capacity to (a) learn from other organisations and therefore identify multiple benefits, (b) have a greater organisational capacity to capture these multiple benefits, and (c) become more open to others to learn from thereby contributing to the reduction of information gaps between M&E users and providers.
But how are learning organisations built and incentivised? There is a large set of literatures on how organisational incentives and wider institutional incentives affect learning. There are two major strands: on organisational learning (Huber 1991; Easterby-Smith 1997) and on learning organisations (Senge 1990; Roper and Pettit 2003) . Oswald and Taylor (this IDS Bulletin) review much of this literature.
There is a great deal of overlap between the two approaches.
27 Characterising both at their extremes, we can describe organisational learning as understanding how organisations learn about themselves and how they make decisions. Here learning is very much a means to an end -better performance defined as improved project outcomes. At the other extreme, we have learning as an end in and of itself as well as being a means to an end. The focus is more openly normative about the values it espouses (diversity, non-hierarchy, boundary-spanning, critically selfreflective) and, importantly, attempts to link the organisation strongly into a wider social system (Easterby-Smith et al. 1999 ).
Again at their extremes, the two approaches can be characterised as in Figure 5 : organisational learning focuses more on single-loop learning from results to shaping goals, values and strategies. The learning organisation approach focuses more on the double-loop learning whereby underlying assumptions are challenged (Argyris and Schon 1978) . These distinctions are fluid. As Roper and Pettit (2003) note the learning organisation approaches can be very pragmatic, emphasising knowledge creation linked to organisational goals linked to action. Similarly many organisational learning approaches are designed to examine the underlying assumptions and risks about their projects, organisation and context.
Oswald and Taylor in this IDS Bulletin argue that some of the organisational disincentives that drive a lack of learning from M&E could be changed with self-reporting systems and participatory forms of M&E. Linking such systems to incentive structures within organisations could be a key starting point (Pasteur and Scott-Villiers 2006) .
Can beneficiary feedback support the realignment of incentives within organisations and promote single-loop or even double-loop learning? Brett contends that 'because agencies are often providing services (for example, the empowerment of rural women) whose output cannot be priced and whose impact is very difficult to observe … these agencies will perform effectively only where workers are genuinely committed and where managers know that citizens or donors are able to monitor what they are doing, and able to withdraw support should they fail ' (2000: 18) . A shift towards such participatory feedback approaches linked to appropriate incentive structures is not easy and it is clear that organisations must understand the potential benefits for their own learning (Abbot and Guijt 1998) . Thompson (1995) , reviewing the literature on why government bureaucracies in the South have shifted towards participatory approaches, shows there are four main drivers. 1 Expediency: attempts to do more with less have forced agencies to find new ways of implementing programmes. In the current climate of austerity it is likely that organisations will need to continue to find ways to be more efficient. There is some evidence to show that feedback systems and other forms of participation can be cost effective in terms of identifying rapid corrections to projects (World Bank 2009) and making projects more relevant for beneficiaries (Magione et al. 2005) , although in certain circumstances they may also increase logistical and transaction costs of monitoring (World Bank 2009; Parkinson 2009 ). Abbot and Guijt (1998) argue that further study on costs is needed.
2 Pressure from the donor community: where donors have demanded greater involvement of beneficiaries in decision-making this has been an important factor (Johnson 2001). However, such demand is often accompanied by greater focus on accountability in general, which may have the effect of increasing pressure on agencies to perform to donor-defined standards (Thompson 1995) . Nevertheless, donors are the key agents of change. If they show the kind of Most Learning (Single-Loop) Improvement within an existing system that rests on unchallenged assumptions that are implicit and unchallenged Double-Loop Learning Expanding the analytical frame to explicitly identify and then challenge underlying assumptions leadership that sets up feedback systems for the greater good even if this may prove inconvenient for them at a later date then they can begin to create real partnerships.
3 Recognition of limits of top-down, blue-print development: these approaches have been seen to be ineffective in addressing the complex realities of poor people (see Rodrik 2008) . Widening the set of stakeholders consulted reduces the likelihood of reverting to blueprints.
4 Stories of successful application of participatory approaches by other organisations have been convincing in persuading others to try.
For those who advocate greater organisational attention to beneficiary involvement and feedback in M&E, there are a number of drivers to engage with and to leverage. The main driver, however, will be the answer to the questions: does it work, when and how? As we have seen in Section 4.1 the evidence base is patchy. A systematic review, especially one drawing on rich country experience, is badly needed. 
Building wider learning
Finally, a people-centred perspective to M&E can enable the sharing of M&E performance information more openly to support wider learning about what works, how, by whom, and under what circumstances. It does this by creating and sharing public goods. Table 3 shows some of the mechanisms and their hypothesised impacts on identifying benefits, capturing more indirect benefits and learning, and closing information gaps between M&E stakeholders.
Sharing data: As Thompson (1995) argues, highlighting success stories is one way of encouraging organisations to adopt new practices. Examples include the opening up of the World Bank's database on development statistics 30 and new efforts to make health research data available.
31 Radelet and Siddiqi (2007) show the value of making M&E project data available. They use data from the first 134 evaluated programmes funded by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria and correlate performance grades with programme characteristics. They find, for example, that projects which receive initial 'accept' scores are associated with better performance some years later, suggesting -but not proving -a return to initial investments in thinking through the project theory of change and implementation issues. There are many project databases available which could be brought into the public domain and analysed for public goods purposes and for organisational learning.
Conducting systematic research on M&E:
There are very few systematic reviews on M&E and even fewer with features of 'people-centred' M&E. One such systematic review was conducted by Miller and Campbell (2006) evaluating the claims made by proponents of 'empowerment evaluation', an approach to M&E which casts the evaluator as an agent of social change. Note that this approach is distinct from our hypothesis about voice, which says that a more balanced set Greater capacity to identify X X X benefits from M&E work elsewhere Greater ability to claim X X benefit for more indirect benefits Learning about reputations X X and performance of M&E users and providers of voices will help establish a consensus Theory of Change and help planning for impact and learning from the intervention, and make grantees and funders more responsive to beneficiary needs. Miller and Campbell evaluate 46 evaluations that call themselves 'empowerment evaluations'. They classified them according to approaches to empowerment (Socratic, structured guidance and participatory) and then they assessed the claims made by the authors against the stated goals of empowerment evaluation. They did not evaluate whether the approach strengthened the impacts of the projects in terms of outcomes such as income. Nearly all evaluations drew on community knowledge, but only 19 per cent of them reported on evidence-based strategies that appreciated the value of scientific evidence. This research clearly shows the value of shining a light on the difference between rhetoric and reality in M&E.
Creating comparator data:
We argue that to deal with the information asymmetries in M&E provision, there is significant value in collecting comparator data on both M&E suppliers and users. There are many mechanisms that rate non-profit organisations and charities (http://greatnonprofits.org/ and www.charitynavigator.org/). There are mechanisms that evaluate private foundations (Center for Effective Philanthropy's Grantee Perception Reports) and international networks, social investors and international development NGOs (Keystone Accountability's Performance Surveys). There are indices that rate the effectiveness of aid agencies (Center for Global Development's Commitment to Development Index). There are also programmes that rate think tanks (www.sas.upenn.edu/irp/). We cannot find any mechanism that rates M&E providers. Nor can we find any site or programme that rates the capacity to use M&E information for improved performance. Both the African Evaluation Association and the American Evaluation Association have publicly searchable databases of evaluators, with neither organisation endorsing the list in terms of quality of provider or performance assessment by third parties. Could this be done through a reputation market?
32 As Jackson (2009) reports, Dellarocus (2002) suggests that online reputation markets are most likely to succeed where traditional trust building mechanisms (e.g. state-enforced contractual guarantees) fail.
The characteristics of these successful online reputation markets include: lack of repeated interaction (e.g. one-off trades are most common), large numbers of small players, geographically dispersed actors, and relationships built on easily changeable pseudonyms. Jackson notes that these features (with the exception of geographic dispersion) do not seem to characterise the marketplace for agricultural M&E. Instead he suggests effort should be made to develop criteria for verifying the quality of the information provided by M&E organisations/practitioners to existing databases.
Conclusions
The context for M&E is changing. Impact and value for money are the mantra du jour in the age of austerity. But M&E as we currently know it is threadbare. It does not attract enough investment. It is viewed as an enabler of compliance rather than of competence. When it is done well, it is done to satisfy donors, not the intended beneficiaries. Agriculture does not escape this conclusion, and it may even exacerbate it. M&E in agriculture is woeful. Why is it so weak? We argue that investment and interest is low because the multiple benefits of good M&E are not identified and when they are, they cannot be captured. The fact that so much M&E goes on undercover allows this situation to persist.
What can be done? We suggest a new type of M&E is needed, one that is people-centred and which focuses on wellbeing outcomes, and asks people about what they need and what they think is working. There are three components of this approach. First, it balances multiple accountabilities through greater participation in programme design, implementation and evaluation. The literature on the impacts of these approaches has grown in the past ten years and shows more successes than failures. Second, it focuses on enhancing organisational incentives for learning. What needs to change for organisations to engage in single-and doubleloop learning? Beneficiary feedback systems represent one such incentive, and new donor requirements would provide another. The third feature of this people-centred M&E is that it seeks to build wider learning about M&E, its users and its providers. The semi-closed nature of M&E is inhibiting the sharing of learning about what works and who does it well.
We believe that M&E in agriculture has to be improved and this article has presented some hypotheses for how it can be. The evidence is stronger for some of the hypotheses than others. We hope the article opens up a debate about the best ways to strengthen M&E in agriculture. If M&E in agriculture is not improved then we will have wasted the political opportunity represented by the current high interest in food and agriculture. We will have no excuses when the budget axe is eventually aimed at food and agriculture, and we will have failed to meet our obligations to the current and future generations of hungry and malnourished people. (accessed 16 August 2010). 10 This is a self-selected perception survey and so will be subject to bias. We invited people to take part in the following way: 'We are writing to ask for your input to help shape the design of a new initiative to improve M&E practices in agriculture.' It may be the case that those who were more likely to respond to the survey felt that M&E in agriculture is weak, although there is no ex ante reason to expect that the relative weights given to any one cause of its weakness would be biased. A multiple regression analysis of these data showed that NGOs as a group tended to rate M&E in agriculture more strongly than other groups. 11 This is similar to other frameworks, such as the purposes identified by the European Commission (2007) (see Lucas and Longhurst, this IDS Bulletin) and Mackay (2007) . 12 Woolcock's review (2009) (Victora 1995) . Similarly, a review of 127 studies of 258 community health financing programmes found that only two studies were able to derive robust conclusions about the impact on access to health services (ILO 2002) . 15 Their discussion is primarily focused on the incentives for organisational learning and thus primarily concerned with implementing organisations, but these mirror the overall misalignment of incentives in the aid system (Barder 2009 ). 16 The dilemma of the role of implementing agencies in this situation is the argument behind the concept of the alien-hand syndrome (Power et al. 2002) . They argue that the success of the implementing agencies is dependent on satisfying the donor, not the community it serves. This disconnect results in 'success' -i.e. empowering communities and giving them voice -possibly being detrimental to the success of the implementing agency because it creates a direct accountability link which may threaten the organisation's methods, mission or focus if a community has the ability to question the organisation's choices or approaches. Power compares non-profits to the private sector where there is an incentive to engage in organisational learning that values the knowledge and experiences of the customer, as this will help determine success. The dilemma is unique to the aid system -in countries whose public services are financed by taxation, those who deliver public services are accountable to politicians, who in turn are accountable to tax payers -the same people who are meant to benefit from public services (Barder 2009 Beneficiaries have access to knowledge, expertise and relationships that other actors do not. But these views may not be the most accurate in the system, nor the most costeffective to access, nor any less politically motivated or subject to capture than other actors in the system (see for instance Parkinson 2009 ). As such our approach can be seen as a combination of a rights and a results-based approach. See Jacobs et al. in this IDS Bulletin for a detailed discussion. 21 The study provides strong statistical evidence that increasing beneficiary participation leads directly to better project performance -a 10 per cent increase in participation of the rural poor in these projects resulted in a 2 per cent increase in overall performance. 22 The Khwaja study is methodologically the most rigorous, comparing a random selection of community-driven projects with similar but non-community-driven projects in the same village. This concludes that community participation significantly improves outcomes when the community is involved in nontechnical decisions, but worsens them when the community is involved in technical decisions that require expert knowledge. 23 An update note by the same authors a few years later (Mansuri and Rao 2006 ) is noteworthy because there are so few additional studies on the impact of participation on project outcomes (there are a few more on the distribution of benefits which give similar results to the initial paper). 24 This study is suspect because of the way in which they report the same Hoddinott et al. paper (2001) . Platteau states 'Hoddinott et al. (2001) (who) studied the effects of participation in public work programs in the Western Cape Province in South Africa. Their results indicate that participation has no effect whatsoever on any of the (employment) outcome variables that they have considered.' 25 Gaventa and Barrett (2010) 
